

July 31, 2019

The Honorable Adriano Espaillat U.S. House of Representatives 1630 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Espaillat:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

As you know, the Communications Act limits franchise fees to five percent of cable revenues and defines "franchise fee" to include "any tax, fee, or assessment of any kind imposed by a franchising authority or other governmental entity on a cable operator or cable subscriber, or both, solely because of their status as such." 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(1). In Montgomery County, Md. et al. v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the terms "tax" and "assessment" were broad enough to encompass nonmonetary exactions—such as cable-related, in-kind contributions. 863 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2017). But the court held that just because the statutory definition of "franchise fee" could include such nonmonetary contributions did not necessarily mean that it did include them, and it remanded the issue to the Commission for further consideration. See id. at 491-92.

In response to this remand, the Commission unanimously issued its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider the scope of the congressionally-mandated statutory limit on franchise fees. The Commission developed a voluminous record in response to this notice, including numerous submissions from local franchising authorities, providers of PEG programming, and cable operators.

The draft order is the product of our careful consideration of this record. The result, we believe, is both consistent with the Act and responsive to your concerns regarding PEG programming. Among other things, the Commission observed that Congress broadly defined franchise fees; indeed, with respect to PEG channels, it only excluded support payments with respect to franchises granted prior to October 30, 1984 as well as certain capital costs required by franchises granted after that date. 47 U.S.C. §§ 542(g)(2)(B) & (C). The draft order therefore concludes that cable-related, in-kind contributions—including PEG-related contributions—are "franchise fees" subject to the Act's five-percent cap unless otherwise expressly excluded.

### Page 2—The Honorable Adriano Espaillat

The draft order also broadens the Commission's interpretation of an exclusion for certain PEG-related capital costs. These latter two conclusions directly address the concerns raised in your letter concerning the order's potential impact on PEG programming.

Again, thank you for your letter. Your views have been entered into the record of the proceeding and have been considered as part of the Commission's review. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Giran V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Brian Higgins U.S. House of Representatives 2459 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Higgins:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

Kajit V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel U.S. House of Representatives 2462 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Engel:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Kajit V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Grace Meng U.S. House of Representatives 1317 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congresswoman Meng:

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### Page 2—The Honorable Grace Meng

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Sincerely.

Ajit V. Pai



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks U.S. House of Representatives 2234 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Meeks:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Hakeem Jeffries U.S. House of Representatives 1607 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Jeffries:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

La V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Max Rose U.S. House of Representatives 1529 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Rose:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

Kajit V. Pai



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey U.S. House of Representatives 2365 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Congresswoman Lowey:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai a



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Nydia M.Velazquez U.S. House of Representatives 2302 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congresswoman Velazquez:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

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Sincerely,

KAjit V. Pai



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Tom Suozzi
U.S. House of Representatives
226 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Suozzi:

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Git V. Pai Par



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke U.S. House of Representatives 2058 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congresswoman Clarke:

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### Page 2—The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke

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July 31, 2019

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler U.S. House of Representatives 2109 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

#### Dear Congressman Nadler:

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### Page 2—The Honorable Jerrold Nadler

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Again, thank you for your letter. Your views have been entered into the record of the proceeding and have been considered as part of the Commission's review. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

Ajit V. Pai



July 31, 2019

The Honorable Jose E.Serrano U.S. House of Representatives 2354 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

### Dear Congressman Serrano:

Thank you for your letter regarding the impact that the statutory cap on franchise fees has on funding for public, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels. The Commission recently released the attached draft *Third Report and Order*, which the Commission plans to consider during its upcoming August meeting. While this draft may change in response to further input from stakeholders and Commissioners, you will see that it addresses in detail each of the concerns raised in your letter.

As you know, the Communications Act limits franchise fees to five percent of cable revenues and defines "franchise fee" to include "any tax, fee, or assessment of any kind imposed by a franchising authority or other governmental entity on a cable operator or cable subscriber, or both, solely because of their status as such." 47 U.S.C. § 542(g)(1). In Montgomery County, Md. et al. v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the terms "tax" and "assessment" were broad enough to encompass nonmonetary exactions—such as cable-related, in-kind contributions. 863 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2017). But the court held that just because the statutory definition of "franchise fee" could include such nonmonetary contributions did not necessarily mean that it did include them, and it remanded the issue to the Commission for further consideration. See id. at 491-92.

In response to this remand, the Commission unanimously issued its Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider the scope of the congressionally-mandated statutory limit on franchise fees. The Commission developed a voluminous record in response to this notice, including numerous submissions from local franchising authorities, providers of PEG programming, and cable operators.

The draft order is the product of our careful consideration of this record. The result, we believe, is both consistent with the Act and responsive to your concerns regarding PEG programming. Among other things, the Commission observed that Congress broadly defined franchise fees; indeed, with respect to PEG channels, it only excluded support payments with respect to franchises granted prior to October 30, 1984 as well as certain capital costs required by franchises granted after that date. 47 U.S.C. §§ 542(g)(2)(B) & (C). The draft order therefore concludes that cable-related, in-kind contributions—including PEG-related contributions—are "franchise fees" subject to the Act's five-percent cap unless otherwise expressly excluded.

### Page 2—The Honorable Jose E. Serrano

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